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On Kelly Betting: Some Limitations
Chung-Han Hsieh1 and B. Ross Barmish2
Abstract—The focal point of this paper is the so-called
Kelly Criterion, a prescription for optimal resource allocation
among a set of gambles which are repeated over time. The
criterion calls for maximization of the expected value of the
logarithmic growth of wealth. Considerable literature exists
providing the rationale for such an optimization. This paper
begins by describing some of the limitations of the Kelly-based
theory in the existing literature. To this end, we fill a void in
published results by providing specific examples quantifying
what can go wrong when Taylor-style approximations are used
and when wealth drawdowns are considered. For the case of
drawdown, we describe some research directions which we feel
are promising for improvement of the theory.
I. INTRODUCTION
The focal point of this paper is the so-called Kelly Criterion
introduced in the seminal paper [1]. Given n gambles with
return governed by some random vector X ∈ Rn, Kelly’s
theory indicates what fraction Ki of one’s account value V
to invest in the i-th bet. Letting K be the column vector with
components Ki, the classical formulation of this problem
requires Ki ≥ 0 for i = 1, 2, ..., n and
K1 +K2 + · · ·Kn ≤ 1.
The problem formulation also includes the standing
assumption that this gamble is repeated over and over again
via independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) trials
for X and that K is such that survival is assured. This
notion will be made precise in the sequel.
Noting that the account value begins at some initial
level V (0) > 0 and letting X(k) be the k-th outcome for X ,
evolution to terminal state V (N) is described sequentially
by the recursion
V (k + 1) = (1 +KTX(k))V (k).
Letting X ⊂ Rn denote the support of X which we assume
to be closed, in order to assure satisfaction of the survival
requirement, admissible K must satisfy the condition
min
X∈X
KTX ≥ −1.
Henceforth, to denote the totality of the constraints above,
we write K ∈ K and note that K is convex. To conclude this
overview, it is noted that there are many possible variations
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and extensions of this problem formulation in the literature.
For example, one can allow Ki > 1 to include leverage
considerations and Ki < 0 to model short sales. Finally, we
mention one of the most important application areas for the
ideas to follow: trading and portfolio balancing problems in
financial markets. Following the results in [1], we see a trail
in the literature over the subsequent decades dealing with
all sorts of applications, generalizations and improvements
of the theory; e.g., see [5], [6], [10], and [13].
A. Problem Formulation
The classical Kelly problem is to select K ∈ K so as
maximize the expected value of the logarithmic growth
g(K)
.
=
1
N
E
[
log
(
V (N)
V (0)
)]
.
Using the recursion for V (k) above, the additivity of the log
function, the fact that X(k) are i.i.d., it is easy to show that
the expected log-growth function reduces to
g(K) = E[ log(1 +KTX) ]
=
∫
X
log(1 +KTx)fX(x)dx
where fX(x) denotes the probability density function for X .
Subsequently, when the constraint K ∈ K is included, it is
easy to show that the optimal logarithmic growth
g∗
.
= max
K∈K
g(K)
is a concave program in K .
To provide one of the simplest possible illustrations
for all of the above, the literature in [1] considers
flipping a biased coin with gambling return X(k) = 1
with probability p > 1/2 and X(k) = −1 with
probability 1 − p. In this scenario, fX(x) is described
by a pair of Dirac Delta functions and it is readily
shown by straightforward differentiation of g(K) above
that the optimal fraction, K = K∗, is given by K∗ = 2p−1.
B. Why Use the Logarithmic Growth?
Use of the Kelly Criterion has a number of advantages over
the use of the more classical expected value of terminal
wealth E[V (N)]. To illustrate why this is so, for n = 1,
if E[X(k)] is just “slightly” positive, it is easy to see
that the optimum is obtained by making K as large as
permitted; e.g., for the case of an even-money bet on a
biased coin with winning probability p = 0.5+ ε, no matter
how small the advantage ε > 0 is, maximizing E[V (N)]
dictates using K = 1. Such as strategy is arguably far too
aggressive to use for a game which is being played over
and over again. With N large, it is almost certain that V (k)
will be drawn down to zero; i.e., gambler’s ruin will occur.
In contrast to the use of E[V (N)] above, the Kelly
Criterion, in its use of E[log(V (N)], automatically factors
some degree of risk into the analysis. For the case of the
coin above with small ε > 0, the optimum turns out to
be K = 2ε, thereby much more likely to avoid gambler’s
ruin. By taking into account the exponential growth rate
of wealth and carrying out the myopic period-by-period
optimization leading to optimal logarithmic growth, a
number of desirable properties result thereby making the
Kelly Criterion a powerful tool in finance; see [11] where
a nice summary of both the desirable and undesirable
properties are given. In this regard, of foremost importance
is the following: When the optimal Kelly fractions Ki
increase, various risk measures become unacceptably large.
Hence, the literature also includes a number of papers
dealing with “fractional strategies.” Essentially, this amounts
to reduction of the Ki, often in ad hoc manner; e.g.,
see [9]. Finally, to provide further context for the sections
to follow, we mention other related papers in the literature,
see [2]-[8], [10], [12]-[14], and single out [15] which has
the same control-theoretic point of view described below.
C. Feedback Control System Point of View
The problem formulation above is readily interpreted
in terms classical feedback control theory. That is, we
view V (k) as the state of a system with linear feedback
and n inputs corresponding to the investment levels Ii(k)
for each of the gambles. That is, the i-th input of the control
signal is given by
Ii(k) = KiV (k)
with Ki ≥ 0 viewed as a feedback gain. Subsequently, the
state for this stochastic system is updated via the equation
V (k + 1) = V (k) +
n∑
i=1
Ii(k)Xi(k)V (k)
= (1 +KTX(k))V (k).
This type of feedback-control configuration is depicted in
Figure 1; see [17] where this paradigm is pursued in much
greater detail.
D. Plan for Sections to Follow
Although limitations of the Kelly-based theory are
mentioned in the existing literature, there is a paucity of
specific examples illustrating the degree to which things
can “go wrong.” To this end, Section 2 concentrates on
approximation methods in the literature which are used
to optimize the allocation vector K . As shown in the
Fig. 1: Feedback Control Equivalent of Kelly Betting
sequel, the Taylor series are used to approximate the
log-growth function, we see that the solution which is
obtained may be either infeasible or lead to performance
which is significantly lower than that of the true optimum.
In addition, we show that approximate solutions may have
a certain “inefficiency property” which is undesirable.
Although our examples to follow provide specific realizations
of the “badness” which can occur, it should also be noted
that a “remedy” is readily available. That is, some papers,
for example, see [3] and [10], recognize that the log-growth
problem is a concave program. Hence, it is arguable that
approximation methods are not needed because there
are readily available commercial codes which efficiently
solve the problem at hand; see [18] and [19]. At the time
that some of the earlier papers were written, such codes
were not readily available and authors either resorted to
approximation or developed algorithms of their own; see [4].
In Section 3, a concern which is much more serious
than approximation is addressed — the issue of wealth
drawdown. Suffice it to say, the literature already recognizes
that the Kelly gains Ki which result, although being log-
growth optimal, may be too aggressive in the short term; i.e.,
the wealth level V (k) may fall to unacceptably low levels
along sample pathes. For this reason, as mentioned earlier,
some authors resort to a so-called “fractional” betting
scheme by scaling back the Ki; e.g., see [9] and [11]. Other
authors resort to incorporation of constraints to reduce the
drawdown effect; e.g., see [10]. After quantifying some of
the negatives regarding drawdown, in Section 4, we describe
some research directions which we feel are promising for
mitigation of the drawdown problem. Finally, in Section 5,
some conclusions are given and other directions of research
are mentioned.
II. NEGATIVES ASSOCIATED WITH APPROXIMATION
In order to obtain the optimal logarithmic growth rate g∗
above, as previously mentioned, one approach in the
literature involves approximation — either a multivariate
Taylor expansion to the log-growth function is used or X(k)
is treated as a Geometric Brownian Motion and low
order expansion terms are used; e.g., see [6], [12], [13],
and [14]. The main objective in this section is to point
out some “pitfalls” associated with approximate solution.
While approximation-based closed-form solutions for the
optimal K provide a degree of insight into the risk-return
tradeoffs, concrete examples do not appear in the literature
which demonstrate scenarios where approximation methods
lead to erroneous results. Suffice it to say, when the range of
variation of X(k) can be large, the true optimum K = K∗
and associated logarithmic growth g(K∗) can differ
considerably from its approximation.
A. Example Involving Approximation
We consider the somewhat attractive gamble for
which n = 1, X = 0.15 with probability p = 0.95
and X = −0.95 with probability p = 0.05. We call
this bet “attractive” in a central-limiting sense; i.e.,
since E[X ] = 0.095, repeated i.i.d. trials, will almost
certainly lead to success. Now, according to [13], using the
approximation
E[log(1 +KX)] ≈ KE[X ]− 1
2
K2E[X2],
it is straightforward to see that the associated optimum
investment fraction K , call it κTaylor, is given by
κTaylor =
E[X ]
E[X2]
= 1.4286.
Note that this solution is not feasible because K ∈ [0, 1]
is assumed. Hence, to guarantee feasibility, a saturation
function is introduced for the approximate solution above.
Thus, the optimal approximate solution with saturation, call
it KTaylor, and the associated expected log-growth are as
follows
KTaylor = SAT [κTaylor] = 1;
g(KTaylor) ≈ −0.017
where SAT [x] is a saturation function; i.e., for x < 0,
SAT [x] = 0; for 0 ≤ x ≤ 1, SAT [x] = x and for x > 1,
we have SAT [x] = 1.
An alternative approach, for example, see [6] and [12],
with X(k) being treated as a Geometric Brownian Motion
with drift µ = E[X ] and variance σ2 = V AR(X). A
subsequent Taylor approximation leads to approximate
solution, call it κGBM, as
κGBM =
E[X ]
V AR[X ]
= 1.6529.
Similarly, it is infeasible with restriction K ∈ [0, 1] so
the saturation is required. Here, the associated optimal ap-
proximate solution, call it as KGBM, and the corresponding
expected log-growth are given by
KGBM = SAT [κGBM] = 1;
g(KGBM) ≈ −0.017.
In contrast to the two approximate solutions above, the
true optimum, as described in Section 1, is obtained by
maximizing the expected logarithmic growth
g(K) = 0.95 log(1 + 0.15K) + 0.05 log(1− 0.95K)
which, by straightforward differentiation, leads to a feasible
solution in [0, 1] and optimal growth given by
K∗ ≈ 0.6667; g(K∗) ≈ 0.0404.
A summary of all three solutions is given in Figure 2. Iron-
ically, the approximation-based results yields the minimum
growth of g(K) rather than the desired maximum. Suffice it
to say, the combination of approximation and saturation due
to constraint violation can lead to significant error.
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Fig. 2: Expected Logarithmic Growth Rate
To quantify further, we convert the expected log-growth into
an annualized rate of return using
r(K)
.
=
1
∆t
(eg(K) − 1).
Assuming daily betting, where ∆t is the time between bets
in years, we take ∆t = 1/252 and then, the corresponding
expected annualized rates of return are computed to be
r(K∗) ≈ 10.384;
r(KTaylor) = r(KGBM) ≈ −3.443.
In other words, the approximate betting schemes perform
poorly compared to what is possible.
B. More Realistic Example with Real Stock Data
In this example, we further consider the problems associated
with approximation by using an example involving real data
for two stocks: Tesla Motors and IBM during the ninety-
day period January 2, 2013 until May 13, 2013. We used
the adjusted daily closing prices, see Figure 3, to estimate
the joint probability mass function and carried out an in-
sample constrained maximization of g(K) subject to the
constraint K1 +K2 ≤ 1, we obtain
K∗1 = 1; K
∗
2 = 0.
That is, the optimum log-growth solution involves all funds
invested in Tesla and no investment in IBM. Now, suppose
instead that one computes the Taylor-based solutions; i.e.,
κTaylor = Σ−1(X)E[X ] = [5.321 2.725]T ;
κGBM = Σ¯−1(X)E[X ] = [5.599 2.681]T
where Σ(X) is the second moment matrix for X and Σ¯(X)
is the covariance matrix for X . Note that the approximate
solutions κTaylor and κGBM are infeasible since the
constraint is violated. The true optimum solution and
approximate solutions along with κTaylor and κGBM are
seen in Figure 4.
Given the constraint violation K1 + K2 > 1 for the
Taylor and GBM solutions, one standard approach is to
project these solutions onto the constraint satisfaction set.
That is, we take
KTaylor = Proj(κTaylor) ≈ [0.661 0.339]T ;
KGBM = Proj(κGBM) ≈ [0.661 0.339]T
where Proj(·) is a projection function given by
Proj(K1,K2)
.
=
[
K1
K1 +K2
K2
K1 +K2
]T
for all nonnegative K1,K2 with not both K1,K2 = 0.
However, one should note that although the projection
procedure provides a way for yielding a feasible solution,
the projected solution may not be the optimal.
C. Inefficiency of Approximate Solution
In this subsection, we point out another danger associated
with the use of approximate solutions. The takeoff point
is the following principle widely used in finance: If two
investments have the same risk, the one with the smaller
reward will be discarded and deemed to be “inefficient.”
We claim that the use of either the approximation KTaylor
or KGBM might be inefficient. We now provide such an
example using KTaylor and note that the same example can
be used for KGBM too. Indeed, we consider a random vari-
able X described as follows: Given γ > 0, we have X = γ
with probability p > 0 and X = −1 with probability 1− p.
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Fig. 3: Two Stock Prices: TSLA and IBM
Using the Taylor approximation, as a function of reward
level γ, a straightforward calculation yields
KTaylor(γ) = SAT
[
pγ + p− 1
pγ2 − p+ 1
]
.
In order forKTaylor(γ) to be efficient from an economic risk-
taking point of view, it should have the following property:
When γ2 ≥ γ1 ≥ 0, we require K(γ2) ≥ K(γ1). That is,
if the bet associated with γ2 offers more reward with the
same probabilities of success and failure as those for γ1, a
rational gambler should invest at least as much in the γ2 bet
as the γ1 bet. We claim that the Taylor-based approximation
scheme fails to satisfy this condition. To establish this claim,
it suffices to show that dKTaylor/dγ can be negative with the
KTaylor(γ) in (0, 1). Indeed, we calculate
dKTaylor
dγ
= −p pγ
2 + 2(p− 1)γ + p− 1
(p γ2 − p+ 1)2
and note that the denominator cannot vanish. Hence, we
see dKTaylor/dγ < 0 for
γ > γ∗(p)
.
=
1− p+√1− p
p
which corresponds to the zero-crossing of the numerator. In
the Figure 5, the plot of KTaylor is given for p = 0.8. It
is readily apparent that the claimed inefficiency occurs for
parameter range γ > γ∗(0.8) ≈ 0.809.
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Fig. 4: Constraint Violation Example for Two Stocks Case
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Fig. 5: KTaylor(γ) Plot for p = 0.8
III. NEGATIVES ASSOCIATED WITH DRAWDOWN
As described in [10] and [16], control of drawdown, that is,
control of the drops in wealth from peaks to subsequent lows,
is one of great concern from a risk management perspective.
In this section, we first demonstrate that Kelly betting often
results in very poor drawdown performance. Then, we dis-
cuss some approaches for mitigating the drawdown problem
within this framework. Along any sample path V (k), the
maximum percentage drawdown is defined as
D(K)
.
= max
0≤l≤k≤N
V (l)− V (k)
V (l)
.
In the sequel, we often drop the word “percentage” for
expression simplicity.
As mentioned in Section 1, use of Kelly fraction may
lead to a significant drawdown since it is too aggressive.
To quantify see how bad the drawdown can be, consider
betting N times of single coin flipping gamble for
which X = 1 with probability p and X = −1 with
probability 1− p, then it is easy to show that the probability
of maximum drawdown greater than or equal to any
fraction K ∈ (0, 1) is given by
P (D(K) ≥ K) = 1− pN .
Now if we take N = 252 and p = 0.99, using the optimal
Kelly investment fraction K∗ = 2p − 1 = 0.98, It follows
that there is a 92% chance that maximum drawdown is
over 98%. That is, there is a large drawdown occurs with
very high probability. A similar analysis using the Markov
inequality also leads to the same conclusion.
A. Control of Drawdown
To control the drawdown, one possible choice is to add prob-
abilistic constraint to the optimization of log-growth; i.e.,
given 0 < ε < 1 and 0 < δ < 1, consider the constraint
P (D(K) ≤ ε) ≥ 1− δ.
Alternatively, instead of using the probabilistic constraint
above, we can use the expected maximum drawdown; i.e.,
given 0 < ε < 1, consider the drawdown constraint as
E[D(K)] ≤ ε.
We now revisit the example used in Section 2 with n = 1,
X = 0.15 with probability p = 0.95 and X = −0.95 with
probability p = 0.05.
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Fig. 6: Expected Maximum Percentage Drawdown Versus K
Using the optimum fraction K∗ = 0.6667 already found, it
is clear to see from Figure 6 that the corresponding expected
maximum drawdown are
E[D(K∗)] = E[D(0.6667)] ≈ 0.903 ;
E[D(KTaylor)] = E[D(KGBM)] = E[D(1)] ≈ 1.0 .
This shows that the approximation solution leads to
an almost sure ruin. Now, suppose the gambler adds
constraint E[D(K)] ≤ 0.2
clear to see that the optimal investment fraction K reduces
to K = K∗ ≈ 0.1.
IV. RESEARCH DIRECTIONS INVOLVING DRAWDOWN
Further to the discussion of drawdown above, if the
allocation vector K is multi-dimensional, it would be
desirable to have a convex drawdown constraint so that the
log-growth optimization problem can be treated as concave
program and can be solved in a very efficient way. To this
end, in this section we provide two conjectures involving
convexity of the maximum drawdown.
For motivation, consider the single coin flipping example,
it is clear from the monotonicity in Figure 6 that expected
drawdown is increasing function in K . Thus, for 0 < ε < 1,
the E[D(K)] ≤ ε leads to an interval constraint for K which
is convex. For two identical coins for which Xi = 1 with
probability p = 0.9 and Xi = −1 with probability 1 − p
for i = 1, 2, a Monte Carlo simulation indicates that the
constraint set of expected maximum drawdown defines a
convex set; e.g., see Figure 7. This leads to the following
conjecture.
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Fig. 7: Example of Expected Maximum Drawdown Constraint
Conjecture 1: Given 0 < ε < 1, the set for the expected
maximum drawdown
{K ∈ K : E[D(K)] ≤ ε}
is convex.
Instead of constraining expected maximum drawdown,
we might consider the set for the probability that the
maximum drawdown stays below some level ε > 0. For the
same two identical coins flipping example, Figure 8 shows
that the drawdown constraint set is still convex. This leads
to the following conjecture.
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Fig. 8: Example of Probability of Maximum Drawdown Constraint
Conjecture 2: Given 0 < ε < 1 and 0 < δ < 1, the set for
the probability of maximum drawdown
{K ∈ K : P (D(K) ≤ ε) ≥ 1− δ}
is convex.
Although we have carried out several Monte Carlo
simulations supporting these conjectures, in view of the fact
that involving two coins, the question on the convexity is
still the conjectures which may not be true for general case,
we now introduce a surrogate for expected drawdown.
A. Surrogate for Expected Drawdown
First noting that
D(K) = max
0≤l≤k≤N
V (l)− V (k)
V (l)
= 1− D¯(K)
where
D¯(K)
.
= min
0≤l≤k≤N
V (k)
V (l)
,
define complementary maximum drawdown. We consider this
complementary drawdown as a surrogate and work with the
surrogate constraint
log D¯(K) ≥ log(1 − ε)
Thus, the following lemma indicates that this complementary
drawdown constraint defines a convex set.
Lemma 4.1: Given 0 < ǫ < 1, the set{
K ∈ K : E[log D¯(K)] ≥ log(1− ε) }
is convex.
Proof: Given 0 < ε < 1, we have
E[log D¯(K)] = E
[
log
(
min
0≤l≤k≤N
V (k)
V (l)
)]
= E
[
min
0≤l≤k≤N
log
V (k)
V (l)
]
= E
[
min
0≤l≤k≤N
k−1∑
i=l
log
(
1 +KTX (i)
)]
=
∫
X
min
0≤l≤k≤N
k−1∑
i=l
log
(
1 +KTx
)
fX(x)dx.
Note that the function
k−1∑
i=l
log
(
1 +KTx
)
is concave in K ,
using the fact that the minimum over an index collection of
the concave functions is concave, it follows that E[log D¯(K)]
is a concave function. Hence, the set
{K ∈ K : E[log D¯(K))] ≥ log(1− ε)}
is convex. 
Remark: Since log function is concave, using Jensen’s
inequality, we obtain
E[log D¯(K)] ≤ logE[D¯(K)].
Now exponentiating on both sides, we obtain
E[D¯(K)] ≥ exp(E[log D¯(K)]).
To consider the tightness of this bound, we revisit the single
coin flipping gamble again with probability p = 0.9
and N = 252. Figure 9 provides a comparison
between E[D¯(K)] and exp(E[log D¯(K)]) obatined by
using Monte Carlo simulation. For this simple case, It is
clear that E[D¯(K)] is very close to exp(E[log D¯(K)]). In
other words, the surrogate complementary drawdown can
be a drawdown candidate.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, the focal point was some of the
limitations associated with application the Kelly
Criterion. By way of further research, in addition to
the drawdown issues described in Section 3, another
possibility involves modification of the feedback control
scheme Ii(k) = KiV (k) defining the investment. Perhaps
use of other variables in the “controller” such as the
drawdown itself would result in improved performance.
More generally, it would be of interest to pursue the
Kelly-based theory with other risk metrics such as the
Sharpe Ratio, see [20], in play.
An important line of future research involves extension
of existing results to problems involving with fX(x) not
assumed to be known. For example, when the theory is
applied in a stock-trading context instead of assuming fX(x)
is known, it would make sense to consider the use of an
K
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Fig. 9: Expected Complementary Drawdown and Its Surrogate
adaptive scheme to obtain a K-vector which is time-varying;
i.e., as nature of the market dynamics change, the investment
function is correspondingly adjusted.
To provide a simple illustration how such an adaptive
scheme might work, we consider the coin-flipping game
described in Section 1 with initial account value V (0) = 1
and unknown underlying probability p = 0.6. Now,
the bettor, not knowing p observes outcomes X(k) and
constructs a relative frequency estimate pˆ(k) of p using a
sliding window of size M < N . The first M steps constitute
the training period within which no betting is done, and
then, for k ≥M , the estimator is given by
pˆ(k)
.
=
1
M
k−1∑
i=k−M
max{sign(X(k)), 0}.
Note that the estimator above is used for expressing that the
number of winning bet. Now, using the estimator, we can
obtain investment fraction
Kˆ(k) = 2pˆ(k)− 1
The results, summarized in Figure 10.
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